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A fractional-order difference Cournot duopoly game
with long memory
Baogui Xin∗ Wei Peng† Yekyung Kwon‡
Abstract
We reconsider the Cournot duopoly problem in light of the theory for long memory. We introduce the
Caputo fractional-order difference calculus to classical duopoly theory to propose a fractional-order discrete
Cournot duopoly game model, which allows participants to make decisions while making full use of their
historical information. Then we discuss Nash equilibria and local stability by using linear approximation.
Finally, we detect the chaos of the model by employing a 0-1 test algorithm.
Keywords: Fractional-order difference; Fractional-order discrete dynamical systems; Cournot duopoly
game; Bifurcation and chaos; 0-1 test.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper are twofold. One purpose is to bring together two independent lines of research
in applied mathematics and industrial economics: fractional-order difference equations and Cournot equilib-
ria. The other is to introduce long memory to classical Cournot duopoly games by replacing integer-order
difference equations with fractional-order forms.
1.1 Links between difference equation and Cournot equilibria in the literature
Cournot game theory [1] was proposed in 1838. Many researchers, such as Nash [2], Von Neumann,
and Morgenstern [3], have since made landmark contributions to the development of game theory, which
has become a powerful analytic tool in fields outside economics, such as cyberspace security [4–8], power
systems [9, 10], cytobiology [11], image processing [12], human-machine systems [13], artificial intelli-
gence [14, 15], safety engineering [16, 17], nuclear security [18], oncology [19], system control [20], and
information science [21]. Considering the powerful dynamic characterization ability of difference equations,
the discrete dynamical game with integer-order difference equations has become an important research di-
rection in industrial economics field. Using integer-order difference equations, economics researchers have
developed various interesting discrete Cournot duopoly game models, as shown in Table1.
1.2 Links between fractional-order difference equations and scientific models in the
literature
Dı´az and Osler [49] first presented the theory of fractional-order differences in 1974. Miller and Ross [50]
and Gray and Zhang [51] developed fractional-order difference calculus in 1988. Fractional-order difference
calculus has attracted the interest of many scholars and practitioners, but it is still a young research field
compared to fractional differential calculus, which has developed for more than 300 years. Researchers
of the former include Atici, Eloe, and S¸engu¨l [52–56]; Bastos, Ferreira and Torres [57]; Wu, Baleanu et
al. [58, 59]; Goodrich [60, 61]; Abdeljawad et al. [62–65]; Wei and Wang et al. [67, 68]; Cˇerma´k, Gyo˝ri,
and Nechva´tal [69]; Mozyrska and Wyrwas [70, 71]; and Abu-Saris and Al-Mdallal [72]. Fractional-order
difference calculus is applied in many scientific fields, as shown in Table 2.
1.3 Links between fractional-order difference equations and Cournot duopoly game
The theory of integer-order difference equation is not suitable to analyze the nonlinear dynamic charac-
teristics of the fractional discrete Cournot duopoly game with long memory. We must employ new theories
to analyze the stability, bifurcation, and chaos of the fractional discrete game. Fortunately, researchers have
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Table 1: Cournot duopoly games with integer-order difference equations
Study Number
of players
Decision variables New characteristics
Puu [22] 2 product quantity adaptive expectations
Kopel [23], Govaerts & Ghaziani [24] 2 product quantity unimodal reaction functions
Bischi & Naimzada [25] 2 product quantity bounded rationality
Cavalli, Naimzada, & Tramontana
[26]
2 product quantity gradient-based approach, local monopolistic
approximation
Agliari, Naimzada, & Pecora [27] 2 product quantity differentiated products
Agiza & Elsadany [28, 29]; Elsadany
& Awad [30]; Fan et al. [31]
2 product quantity heterogeneous players
Li, Xie, Lu, & Tang [32] 2 callable product quantity airline revenue management
El-Sayed, Elsadany, & Awad [33] 2 product quantity logarithmic demand function
Awad & Elsadany [34] 2 product quantity social welfare
Elsadany [35] 2 product quantity bounded rationality based on relative profit
maximization
Matsumoto [36] 2 product quantity adaptive expectations
Fanti & Gori [37] 2 product quantity micro-founded differentiated products demand
Xin, Ma, & Gao [38] 2 product quantity adnascent-type relationship
Ma & Guo [39] 2 product quantity quantity estimation and two-stage considera-
tion
Askar, Alshamrani, & Alnowibet
[40]
2 product quantity cooperation arising
Yu [41] 2 car demand heterogeneous business operation modes and
differentiated productsn
Zhang et al. [42] 2 product quantity two-stage, semi-collusion
Tramontana, Gardini, & Puu [43] 2 product quantity competitors operate multiple production plants
Tramontana [44] 2 product quantity isoelastic demand function
Tramontana et al. [45] 2-n product quantity heterogeneous players
Baiardi & Naimzada [46–48] 2-n product quantity best response, imitation rules
produced some useful results for analyzing the stability of fractional-order difference equations, such as ex-
plicit stability conditions [69], explicit criteria for stability [70], stability by linear approximation [71, 94],
asymptotic stability criteria [72], Lyapunov functions [95], finite-time stability [96], and chaos analysis [97].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The relevant literature is reviewed in section 2. In
section 3, a long-memory discrete Cournot duopoly game with Caputo fractional-order difference equations
is presented. The Nash equilibrium points and their local stabilities are studied in section 4. In section 5,
bifurcation diagrams, phase portraits, and 0-1 test algorithms are employed to validate the main results. This
paper concludes with a summary in section 6.
2 Preliminaries
The following definitions of fractional-order difference calculus are introduced.
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Table 2: Non-mathematics applications of fractional-order difference calculus
Study Research field Scientific problem Type of fractional-order difference calculus
Tarasov [73] physics physical lattices fractional-order difference equations
Wu et al. [74] physics anomalous diffusion fractional Riesz-Caputo difference equations
Huang et al. [75]; Ismail et
al. [76]; Liu, Xia, & Wang
[77, 78]; Kassim et al. [79]
cryptography image encryption technique fractional logistic difference equations
Xin et al. [80]; Wu et al.
[81]; Shukla & Sharma [82];
Ouannas et al. [83, 84]; Liu
[85]
system engineering chaos synchronization, con-
trol
fractional nonlinear difference equations
Mozyrska & Pawluszewicz
[86–90]
system engineering controllability, observability fractional-order difference equations
Sierociuk & Twardy [91] system engineering parameter identification variable fractional-order difference equa-
tions
Yin & Zhou [92] image processing image denoising difference curvature driven fractional nonlin-
ear diffusion equations
Liu et al. [93] signal processing Kalman filter nonlinear difference fractional system with
stochastic perturbation
Definition 1 (See [52].) For any real numbers ν, t ∈ R, the ν rising fractional factorial of t is defined as
t(ν) :=
Γ(t + 1)
Γ(t + 1 − ν) , t
(0)
= 1.
Definition 2 (See [51, 52].) Let x : Na → R, a ∈ R, t ∈ Na+ν, and ν > 0. Then the fractional sum of order ν
is defined as
∆
−ν
a x(t) :=
1
Γ(ν)
t−ν∑
s=a
(t − σ(s))(ν−1) x(s),
where a is the start point, Na = {a, a + 1, a + 2, . . .} denotes the isolated time scale, and σ(s) = s + 1.
Definition 3 (See [63].) Let ν > 0, ν < N, t ∈ Na+n−ν, and n = [ν] + 1. Then the ν-order Caputo-like left
delta difference is defined by
C
∆
ν
ax(t) := ∆
−(n−ν)
a ∆
nx(t) =
1
Γ(n − ν)
t−(n−ν)∑
s=a
(t − σ(s))(n−ν−1) ∆ns x(s). (2.1)
Theorem 1 (See [99].) For the Caputo fractional-order difference system

C
∆
ν
ax(t) = f
(
t+, x
(
t+
))
, t+ = t + ν − 1,
∆
kx(a) = xk, k = 0, . . . ,m − 1, m = [ν] + 1,
(2.2)
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the equivalent discrete integral system is written as
x(t) = x0(t) +
1
Γ(ν)
t−ν∑
s=a+m−ν
(t − σ(s))(ν−1) f (s + ν − 1, x (s + ν − 1)) , t ∈ Na+m, (2.3)
where the initial iteration is
x0(t) =
m−1∑
k=0
(t − a)(k)
Γ(k + 1)
∆
kx(a).
Using Definition 1, we can get
(t − σ(s))(ν−1) = (t − s − 1)(ν−1) = t(ν) := Γ(t − s)
Γ(t − s − ν − 1) .
So, we can obtain the following proposition.
Remark 1 If a = 0, we rewrite system (2.2) in the following numerical form
x(n) = x(0) +
1
Γ(ν)
n∑
i=1
Γ(n − i + ν)
Γ(n − i + 1) f (x(i − 1)) , n ∈ N. (2.4)
According to the linearization theorem [94], we obtain the following theorem, which is a special case of
refs. [69, 71].
Theorem 2 Assume that system (2.4) is nonlinear with v ∈ (0, 1), x(t) = (x1(t), x2(t), · · · , xn(t))T , and f (t) =
( f1(t), f2(t), · · · , fn(t))T is continuously differentiable at a fixed point xeq. Then ∀t ∈ Na+1−ν, system (2.4) is
locally asymptotically stable when all eigenvalues λ of the following Jacobian matrix
J(xeq) =
∂ f (x)
∂x
∣∣∣∣∣
x=xeq
=

∂ f1(xeq)
∂x1
∂ f1(xeq)
∂x2
· · · ∂ f1(xeq)
∂xn
∂ f2(xeq)
∂x1
∂ f2(xeq)
∂x2
· · · ∂ f2(xeq)
∂xn
...
...
. . .
...
∂ fn(xeq)
∂x1
∂ fn(xeq)
∂x2
· · · ∂ fn(xeq)
∂xn

are such that
λ ∈
{
z ∈ C : |z| <
(
2 cos
| arg z| − π
2 − ν
)ν
and | arg z| > νπ
2
}
.
Considering a two-dimensional case of system (2.4), we obtain the following theorem, which is a special
case of Theorem 2.
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Theorem 3 (See [69].) Two-dimensional system (2.4) is locally asymptotically stable if det J > 0 and either
−trJ
2
≥
√
det J, ν > log2
√
̟ − trJ
2
, (2.5)
or
|trJ|
2
<
√
det J <
(
2 cos
κ − π
2 − ν
)ν
, ν <
2κ
π
, (2.6)
where ̟ =
∣∣∣(trJ)2 − 4 det J∣∣∣, and κ = trJ√
̟
.
In the following discussion, the time-dependence, subscripts, and superscripts will be omitted from nota-
tion if no confusion is caused.
3 Model
Let us consider a classical Cournot competition between firms 1 and 2, who produce homogeneous prod-
ucts which are perfect substitutes. Let qi(t), i = 1, 2 denote the i−th firm’s output during discrete time periods
t = 0, 1, 2, · · · . For simplicity, as mentioned by Bischi & Naimzada [25] and Agiza & Elsadany [28, 29], we
assume the market-clearing price p(t) at period t, an inverse demand function, is linear and decreasing, as
follows:
p(t) = b − d(qi(t) + q j(t)), i, j = 1, 2, i , j, (3.7)
where b and d are positive constants.
The cost function takes the following form:
Ci(t) =
1
2
ciq
2
i (t), i = 1, 2, (3.8)
where ci, i = 1, 2, is a positive constant.
The i−th firm’s profit can be written as
Πi(qi(t), q j(t)) = p(t)qi(t) − Ci(t), i, j = 1, 2, i , j. (3.9)
Then the i−th firm’s marginal profit can be obtained by differentiating with respect to qi:
Φi(t) =
∂Πi(qi(t), q j(t))
∂qi(t)
= b − (ci + 2d)qi(t) − dq j(t), i, j = 1, 2, i , j. (3.10)
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Now, let us consider the following repeated game mechanism. These two bounded rational firms have
long memories of output decisions. Firms try to employ more complex adjustment mechanisms, which can
be called “bounded rationality with long memory.” The dynamical adjustment mechanism is based on the
long memory effect and the local estimation of the marginal profit, which can be described by
∆
ν
aqi(t) = αiqi(t
+)Φi(t+), i = 1, 2, (3.11)
where αi > 0 is the speed of adjustment, and C∆νa is the ν-order left Caputo-like delta difference. For the
function q(t), the delta difference operator ∆ is defined by ∆q(t) = q(t + 1) − q(t).
Remark 2 When ν = 1 and ∆νaqi(t) = qi(t + 1) − qi(t), then equation (3.11) degenerates to
qi(t + 1) = qi(t) + αiqi(t)Φi(t), i = 1, 2, (3.12)
which agrees with the game model without long-memory effects proposed by Bischi & Naimzada [25] and
Agiza & Elsadany [28, 29].
From the above assumptions, we obtain the following discrete fractional Cournot duopoly game:

C
∆
ν
aq1(t) = α1q1(t
+)
(
b − (c1 + 2d)q1(t+) − dq2(t+)
)
,
C
∆
ν
aq2(t) = α2q2(t
+)
(
b − (c2 + 2d)q2(t+) − dq1(t+)
)
.
(3.13)
4 Nash equilibrium and local stability
The equilibrium points of system (3.13) satisfy

α1q1 (b − (c1 + 2d)q1 − dq2) = 0,
α2q2 (b − (c2 + 2d)q2 − dq1) = 0.
(4.14)
By simple algebraic computation, we obtain four Nash equilibrium points: E1 = (0, 0), E2 =
(
0, b
c2+2d
)
,
E3 =
(
b
c1+2d
, 0
)
, and E4 = (m(c2 + d),m(c1 + d)), where m = bc1c2+2c1d+2c2d+3d2 . They contain the following
economic information:
(i) At the equilibrium point E1 = (0, 0), no single firm has anything to gain by producing its products if
its opponent keeps producing nothing.
(ii) At the equilibrium point E2 =
(
0, b
c2+2d
)
, the best strategy of firm 1 is to produce nothing if firm 2
adopts its equilibrium production strategy q∗2 =
b
c2+2d
. Similarly, the best output of firm 2 is q∗2 =
b
c2+2d
if firm
1 keeps producing nothing as its equilibrium strategy.
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(iii) At the equilibrium point E3 =
(
b
c1+2d
, 0
)
, firm 2 cannot obtain any payoff by producing its products if
firm 1 adopts its equilibrium ouput strategy q∗1 =
b
c2+2d
. In the same way, firm 1 will maintain its equilibrium
output strategy q∗1 =
b
c2+2d
if firm 2 keeps zero output as its equilibrium strategy.
(iv) At the equilibrium point E4 = (m(c2 + d),m(c1 + d)), firm 1 can receive no incremental benefit from
deviating unilaterally from its chosen strategy q1 = m(c2 + d), assuming firm 2 maintains its production
strategy q2 = m(c1 + d), and vice versa.
Obviously, equilibrium points E1, E2, and E3 are bounded equilibria [25]. So, we only analyze the
stability of non-bounded equilibrium point E4, as follows.
Theorem 4 System (3.13) is locally asymptotically stable at Nash equilibrium point E4 if
ν > log2
√
(trJ)2 − 4 det J − trJ
2
, (4.15)
where
trJ = −b(2d
2(α1 + α2) + d(c1(α1 + 2α2) + c2(2α1 + α2)) + c1c2(α1 + α2))
3d2 + 2d(c1 + c2) + c1c2
, (4.16)
det J =
α1α2b
2(c1 + d)(c2 + d)
c1c2 + 2d(c1 + c2) + 3d2
. (4.17)
Proof. The Jacobian matrix J of system (3.13) evaluated at Nash equilibrium points E4 is
J(E4) =

α1(b − m(2c1c2 + 5d2 + d(3c1 + 4c2))) −α1md(c2 + d)
−α2md(c1 + d) α2(b − m(2c1c2 + 5d2 + d(4c1 + 3c2)))
 ,
whose characteristic equation is
p(λ) = λ2 − trJλ + det J,
where trJ and det J are the same as (4.16) and (4.17), respectively.
We algebraically obtain det J > 0, trJ < 0, (trJ)2 − 4 det J > 0, and −trJ2 ≥
√
det J. So, we can use
Theorem 2 to find that system (3.13) is locally asymptotically stable at Nash equilibrium point E4 if eq.
(4.15) holds.
This completes the proof.
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(a) Firm 1.
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Figure 1: Stabilized states of duopoly outputs of system (5.18) with (q1(0), q2(0)) = (0.3, 0.3).
5 Numerical simulation
According to Remark 1, system (5.18) can be rewritten as

q1(n) = q1(0) +
1
Γ(ν)
n∑
i=1
Γ(n − i + ν)
Γ(n − i + 1)α1q1(i − 1) (b − (c1 + 2d)q1(i − 1) − dq2(i − 1)) ,
q2(n) = q2(0) +
1
Γ(ν)
n∑
i=1
Γ(n − i + ν)
Γ(n − i + 1)α2q2(i − 1) (b − (c2 + 2d)q2(i − 1) − dq1(i − 1)) .
(5.18)
We will use eqs. (5.18) to demonstrate stability, bifurcation, and chaos of system (3.13).
Let parameters ν = 0.99, α1 = 0.45, α2 = 0.12, b = 6, d = 4.1, c1 = 0.2, and c2 = 0.3. Then non-
bounded Nash equilibrium point E4 = (0.4836, q2 = 0.4726), trJ = −2.3101 < 0, and det J = 0.67378 > 0.
According to Theorem 4, we can get (trJ)2 − 4 det J = 2.6415 > 0, −trJ2 −
√
det J = 2.0079 > 0, and
ν = 0.99 > log2
√
(trJ)2−4 det J−trJ
2 = 0.9765, which is to say system (3.13) is local asymptotically stable at
non-bounded Nash equilibrium point E4, as shown in Figure 1.
To analyze bifurcation and chaos of the long-memory system (3.13) with fractional-order ν, we vary
the long-memory parameter, fractional-order ν ∈ (0, 1), and fix the remaining parameters as α1 = 0.45,
α2 = 0.12, b = 6, d = 4.1, c1 = 0.2, and c2 = 0.3, with the starting point (q1(0), q2(0)) = (0.3, 0.3), as
shown in Figure 2. This figure includes the bifurcation diagram of firm 1’s output and the scatter diagram
of K, which is the median value of the correlation coefficient of q1. To obtain Figure 2, the long-memory
parameter ν varies from 0 to 1 with an increment of 0.002. The bifurcation diagram of q1 is drawn by using
100 data points after dropping 500 transient data points. K is calculated by taking 3,000 data points after
dropping 500 transient data points. The bifurcation diagram demonstrates the possible long-term values of
firm 1’s output with long-memory parameter ν varying from 0 to 1. The scatter diagram of K illustrates the
possibility of chaos occurrence in system (3.13) corresponding to different values of ν ∈ (0, 1).
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Figure 2: Firm 1’s output bifurcation (blue) and K (red) of system (5.18) with varying ν ∈ (0, 1).
The criterion of the 0-1 chaos test [100–110] shows that bounded trajectories in the (p, s)−plane or K ≈ 0
mean system (3.13) is regular, and Brownian-like trajectories in the (p, s)−plane or K ≈ 1 indicate system
(3.13) is chaotic. So, system (3.13) is chaotic when ν < 0.4, i.e., when K ≈ 1. Obviously, system (3.13)
shows that the bifurcation diagram quite well coincides with the scatter diagram of K.
For Figure 2, let ν = 0.2, which leads to K = 0.9752. We can know that system (3.13) is chaotic, as
shown in Figure 3. To produce Figure 3, we iterate it 3,500 times and draw a duopoly output time series
using the first 300 data points, as shown in Figure 3(a)-(b). We also create its phase portrait (as shown in
Figure 3(c)) and calculate its median correlation coefficient using the last 3,000 data points after dropping
500 transient data points, and draw its trajectories in new coordinates (p, s), as shown in Figure 3(d). From
Figure 3, we can find that their time series are irregular and chaotic, their output phase portrait is a strange
chaotic attractor, and their trajectories in the (p, s)−plane are Brownian-like.
6 Conclusion
We have proposed a nonlinear fractional-order discrete Cournot duopoly gamemodel that shows the long-
memory effect. We discussed its Nash equilibria and local stability by linear approximation, then numerically
illustrated its phase portraits, bifurcation diagrams, and chaos attractors using the 0-1 test algorithm. The
paradigm to analyze the Cournot duopoly game can be applied to other scientific fields. There are still some
open issues regarding fractional-order difference calculus, such as qualitative analysis theories of bifurcation,
and high efficient Lyapunov algorithms.
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(a) Time series of firm 1’s output.
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(c) Phase portrait of duopoly output.
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Figure 3: Chaos in system (5.18) with (q1(0), q2(0)) = (0.1, 0.3).
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